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Economic Legislation Series

INDONESIA’S LAW ON PUBLIC SERVICES: CHANGING
STATE–SOCIETY RELATIONS OR CONTINUING POLITICS AS
USUAL?
Michael Buehler*
Northern Illinois University, Dekalb IL
Institutional reforms introduced after the collapse of the New Order regime have brought
state–society relations in Indonesia under increased scrutiny. This paper uses an evaluation of
Law 25/2009 on Public Services as a means to assess whether the new political setting has
increased the leverage of the citizenry over the state. Adopted in July 2009, the law introduced a
range of regulations for public service

providers. It also expanded the responsibilities of the Ombudsman’s office and
called for the establishment of citizen committees to monitor public service delivery.
However, the legal quality of the law is poor and the broader institutional and political
environment is not conducive to its enforcement. Overall, the law aims beyond the capacity
of the current political and legal system. Ironically, in order for society to gain greater
leverage in politics, state capacity must increase as well.

INTRODUCTION
After Indonesia gained independence in 1949 its bureaucracy rapidly expanded. In the 1950s,
the state apparatus was growing at a rate of ‘something like 10 percent a year’ (Scott 1972: 12),
while in the 1970s the number of bureaucrats increased by 400% (Evers 1987: 666).
Unsurprisingly, the bureaucracy soon became a force in its own right in Indonesian politics,
and drew the attention of academics and development practitioners. Accounts of what
constituted the character of this new player diverged widely. Some saw the bureaucracy as a
predatory, anti-national ‘state-qua-state’ that was highly intrusive into citizens’ lives
(Anderson 1983: 488). For others it was a ‘faction-torn, party-ridden, ramshackle structure
incapable of
action’, where the power and influence of individuals and cliques came ‘at the
expense of organizations and institutions’ (Liddle 1973: 287). Whether predatory and
aggressive, or incapacitated by factionalism and therefore largely passive, the
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bureaucracy was seen as an institution that offered ‘little room for give and take on
policy issues or for sensitivity to public needs’ (Emmerson 1983: 1,221).
In May 2010 the bureaucracy officially consisted of more than 4.7 million civil servants (Badan
Kepegawaian Negeri 2010). This figure is likely to be a significant under-estimate, as it excludes
auxiliary personnel (‘honorarium staff’) contracted under the general labour law. Police and
military personnel are also excluded (Kluyskens n.d.: 5; Van Klinken and Barker 2009: 32).
Nevertheless, in Indonesia’s population of more than 242 million, the percentage of civil servants is
1

remarkably small compared with that in other countries in the region. Further, a large proportion
of the civil service is significantly under-employed. The Deputy Director of the Ministry of
Administrative Reform (Kementerian Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara), Cerdas Kaban,
‘guesstimated’, for example, that there were around 30–40% more bureaucrats on the state’s
payroll than the government actually had work for (Cerdas Kaban, pers. comm., 24 July 2009).
The bureaucracy is highly inefficient and ineffective in delivering public services at both the
national (McLeod 2005) and sub-national level (Von Luebke 2009: 225) and, according to USAID
(2009: 47), the quality of service delivery has stagnated over the last 10 years. Public expenditure
management, organisational structures and mechanisms for staff allocation, recruitment and
remuneration are all in dire need of reform. Although Law 17/2003 on State Finance established a
budget and planning process based on a medium-term expenditure framework, and was intended
to increase transparency, its effectiveness is hindered by legal and political obstacles (Synnerstrom
2007: 162–3). The structure of the bureaucracy is based on models that emphasise organisational
symmetries instead of considering the actual workload of bureaucratic units or cost efficiency
(Synnerstrom 2007: 164–5). Recruitment is carried out in a mechanistic fashion and is rarely based
on need: for example, 1,200 new judges are recruited annually without any assessment of the
number needed (Van Zorge Report 2009).

The civil service is a career-based system, rather than a position-based system into
which professionals can be recruited when required. Payment mechanisms are
non-transparent: civil servants receive a basic salary funded from the state budget, in
addition to a variety of official and unofficial allowances from both budget and
non-budget funds. To a large extent, the distribution of these allowances is at the
discretion of senior bureaucrats (McLeod 2010; Synnerstrom 2007: 168). Endemic
corruption and rent-seeking within the state apparatus weaken state capacity.
Indonesians aspiring to a bureaucratic position pay significant amounts of money to be
considered (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006: 207–33). In their everyday encounters with the
state, citizens are confronted with demands for illegal levies or unofficial payments to
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expedite service delivery. Overall, the bureaucracy continues to be characterised by
‘non-transparent processes, underfunded institutions, an inadequately skilled public
workforce and institutionalised corruption, reflecting a self-serving and opaque
administration’ (Synnerstrom 2007: 160).
1 Kluyskens (n.d.: 3) estimates the percentage of bureaucrats in the total population in
2009 at just 2.0% in Indonesia, compared with 2.8% in Singapore and 3.7% in Malaysia. 2 An idea
of how little has changed in this respect over the last few decades can be gained by comparing the
accounts of such practices in Mitchell (1970: 76–93) and Aragon (2007: 40–1).

The low capacity of the civil service has significant consequences. At the time of
writing, Indonesia was losing ground vis-à-vis China, India, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam in education, foreign direct investment, health, infrastructure and
manufacturing (Harvard Kennedy School 2010: 15). In 2009 Indonesia ranked below all
major economies in the region except the Philippines on ‘ease of doing business’ (IFC
2009: 8). In the same year, an Indonesian child was nearly three times as likely as a
Vietnamese child to die before its fifth birthday (Harvard Kennedy School 2010: vi–vii).
Indonesia’s poor regional performance on such a range of social indicators is
symptomatic of the state’s low service delivery capacity. Against the background
sketched above, this paper will evaluate the recently enacted Law 25/2009 on Public
Services, which constitutes an attempt to improve the effectiveness of the state in
catering to the needs of its citizens.
Bureaucratic reform initiatives
Administrative reform agendas have become an international political phenomenon, and
Southeast Asia is no exception (Leong 2006). In the context of the third wave of
3
democratisation and the rise of the good governance debate, calls for greater bureaucratic
accountability have mounted across the region (Fritzen 2007: 1,440). Indonesia embarked on
an overhaul of its government structures after the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime in
1998 (Crouch 2010: 1–14). Politicians at both the national and local level are pursuing reform
to bolster their democratic credentials and distance themselves from the kleptocratic Soeharto
regime – to which a majority owe their political ascent (Aspinall 2010: 21–2).
One such politician is Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who was elected president
in 2004 on a platform that gave priority to combating corruption, collusion and nepotism.
In December 2004 SBY issued Presidential Instruction 5/2004, consisting of 10 general
instructions and 11 special assignments. All institutions under the authority of the
executive branch of government were urged to eradicate corruption. The National
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional),
then under the leadership of the reform-minded Sri Mulyani Indrawati, was also
instructed to prepare a National Action Plan for the Eradication of Corruption (Rencana
Aksi Nasional Pemberantasan Korupsi). Both documents recognised the importance of
civil service reform to these undertakings, and called for the drafting and
implementation of bureaucratic reform laws (Davidsen, Juwono and Timberman 2006:
23–5).
THE LAW ON PUBLIC SERVICES
Law 25/2009 on Public Services, enacted with the support of all 10 factions in the
national parliament in July 2009 after some four years of deliberation, is a seemingly
important component of this initiative. It aims to improve the delivery of public services
by creating mechanisms for determining minimum service

3 The term ‘third wave of democratisation’ is used to describe the process whereby more
than 60 countries have become democratic since the mid-1970s. The first and second waves of
democratisation occurred after the first and second world wars.

standards, receiving and acting on complaints when standards are not met and, in some
cases, providing compensation.
Some inappropriate content
By way of preliminary comment, one undesirable feature of the new law is that it seeks to
regulate certain matters that are the subject of other laws. First, the law imposes additional
responsibilities on the Ombudsman that should really be the subject of an amendment to Law
37/2008 on the Ombudsman. Second, the new law seeks to reform the way the civil service is
managed. While such reform is needed, to the extent that it requires changes to legislation it is
inappropriate to include it in the Law on Public Services, since this deals with only a limited
part
of the bureaucracy. For example, the law stipulates that officials employed by
public service providers should lose their managerial position if they fail to select and
promote civil servants in a transparent, non-discriminatory and fair manner based on
legal principles (art. 11, clause 1; art. 54, clause 7). They may also face demotion for a
maximum of one year if they fail to conduct periodic performance appraisals (art. 38,
clause 1; art. 54, clause 6). Sanctions for violation of civil service hiring principles or
failure to conduct performance appraisals should be the same for all civil servants,
regardless of whether they are involved in the delivery of public services or not. The
appropriate place for disciplinary measures such as these is in an amendment to Law
43/1999 on the Civil Service.

4

Key aspects
Law 25/2009 is motivated by a concern to ensure the provision of public services in
accordance with the expectations and demands of citizens (preamble). It sets out rules and
obligations for provider organisations (penyelenggara pelayanan publik, public service
providers) and their employees (pelaksana pelayanan publik, public service ‘implementers’) (art.
1, clauses 2, 5), and outlines the rights and responsibilities of resident legal entities and
5
citizens. The law also attempts to establish clear guidelines on the principles and objectives of
public service delivery, and a frame
work for their implementation. These include defined service standards, mandatory
service commitments, a public service information system and a system internal to the
bureaucracy for monitoring and handling complaints. Citizen committees to supervise
and monitor service delivery are also introduced, as well as stipulations to strengthen
existing external mechanisms for the resolution of complaints. Finally, the law includes a
catalogue of sanctions for various transgressions.
4 As one reviewer of this paper pointed out: ‘This is a common … feature [of Indonesian laws] due
to the serious fragmentation of government … [I]nstitutions try to regulate beyond their legal
competence instead of cooperating with relevant institutions to achieve
changes in the relevant laws. This practice explains much of the many regulatory conflicts
in Indonesia.’ 5 In fact there are no meaningful ‘responsibilities’ on the part of the general public in
this law, unsurprisingly, given that its objective is to ensure that the state better serves its citizens.
Article 19 lists the public’s ‘responsibilities’, somewhat imaginatively, as abiding by the public
service minimum standards, assisting in looking after public service facilities and infrastructure,
and actively participating in and abiding by the regulations relating to public services. Such
discussion is well described by the Indonesian expression ‘omong kosong’ (empty talk).

Major flaws
Lack of clear justification and focus
Implementing regulations and a presidential regulation are expected to complete the
operational details of the law, though none of these had been published at the time of
6

writing. It is nevertheless possible to conduct a tentative analysis, which
reveals major flaws in the law. For example, its purpose is unclear: a cogent analysis
of the problems the law seeks to address is not given (such problems are not even
listed) and definitions of critically important terms are often vague or missing. Most
fundamentally, the law attempts but fails to define clearly what constitutes a public
service – the very subject of the law – or a public service provider. There is circularity in
both definitions: public services are those provided by public service providers, while
public service providers are organisations that provide public services. A
commonsense definition, useful in framing the following discussion, is that public
services are those to which citizens have a politically mandated entitlement, and which
are provided by the state (either directly or through contracted private sector
firms) free of charge, or at significantly less than their cost of production.
Failure to distinguish public services from profit-oriented services
The consequences of this lack of definition are crucial. First, it leads to an incoherent listing of
the scope of public services that includes ‘education, teaching, work and enterprise, housing,
communication and information, the environment, health, social security, energy, banking,
7
transportation, natural resources, tourism, and other strategic sectors’. Provided they are
somewhat more carefully speci
fied, several of these items are typically thought of as public services (education,
health care, public housing, social security and public transport). But others (again,
more carefully specified: telecommunications and media, electricity and fuel,
banking services and tourism) are simply services or commodities provided by
the market at prices that cover production costs and provide a margin of profit, in
the absence of any citizen entitlement. The environment and natural resources are areas of
government policy concern, but do not appear to involve the delivery of services to users. The
meaning of ‘work and enterprise’ in this context – and therefore the reason for its inclusion –
is unclear, and the term ‘other strategic sectors’ could be interpreted to mean virtually
anything, and therefore means nothing.
Second, unclear definitions implicitly lead to a failure to distinguish between
the government agencies and private sector contractors that provide public ser
vices financed by government budgets, on the one hand, and the profit-oriented
state-owned and private enterprises whose costs are covered by payments from their
customers on the other. For example, banking, transport and tourism services
are provided on a profit-oriented basis by both state-owned and private sector
enterprises. There is no obvious reason why such activities should be considered
6 It was unclear at the time of writing whether there would be regulations covering the whole civil
service or separate regulations for each sector. There were indications that the Coordinating
Minister for Economic Affairs was drafting implementing regulations related to licensing. If every
sectoral institution is drafting its own implementing regulations, this raises the question of who
oversees this process and what the time-frame for completion would be.
7 The distinction between education and teaching is unclear.

public services and regulated by this law, because dissatisfied citizens can simply take
their business elsewhere. One difficulty here is that various state-owned
enterprises provide services that are heavily subsidised as a matter of policy, but without
any suggestion that citizens have a direct entitlement to these services. The state railway
company Kereta Api Indonesia is an example. The fact that this is a state monopoly
provides an argument that it should be regarded as a public
service provider. By contrast, it would be difficult to argue that the state-owned Garuda
airline should be similarly regarded, as it has no monopoly and is profit
oriented. The law provides no guidance on such cases. Finally, various other public
services that should be included are not speci
fied. Some that readily come to mind relate to the work of the police (for example,
responding to reports of theft and violence); the courts (dealing with civil disputes
and individuals charged with crimes); the land titling office (dealing with land
ownership claims); the departments of immigration (issuing passports) and religious
affairs (controlling the Hajj pilgrimage); agencies responsible for garbage and sewage
disposal; and all agencies responsible for issuing permits and licences.
Burdensome and unnecessary reporting requirements
The law requires the creation of a massive public service information system,
situated at the national level and under (unspecified) ministerial supervision.
This will bring together public service information from all levels of government,
including data on public service providers, service standards and service
announcements, as well as information about complaints management systems and
performance appraisal mechanisms. Public service providers will be responsible for
feeding information into the system, which will be open to the public (art. 23). Given the
low capacity of the bureaucracy, it is doubtful whether this is feasible. More importantly,
it is unclear what purpose such a database would serve, other than generating jobs for
bureaucrats and extending the controlling ministry’s authority over other government
agencies. What matters to the public, presumably, is simply whether service delivery is
satisfactory and, if not, whether complaints are taken seriously. The proposed database,
covering scores – perhaps hundreds – of highly diverse public services, is unlikely to
contribute to such an outcome. It would be sufficient if the respective line ministries and
government agencies provided information to the public on service delivery under their
authority. Government agencies are unlikely to respond with any enthusiasm to the
demand to supply information to this database.
PROVISIONS TO IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY
Because of space limitations, it is not possible to discuss further the many draft
ing inadequacies of Law 25/2009; however, the flaws described so far could be easily
rectified. These matters are set aside to examine three provisions internal to the bureaucracy
that are aimed at improving public service delivery: the introduction of mandatory service
standards, the establishment of monitoring and complaints handling mechanisms, and the
imposition of sanctions. The article then considers two provisions in the law that are intended
to establish or strengthen external oversight mechanisms: the stipulation of new responsi
bilities for the Ombudsman’s office and the establishment of citizen committees

tasked with the ‘supervision’ of public service monitoring. The law is evaluated mainly
in regard to its enforceability.
Defining service standards
Defining the service standards against which provider performance will be
judged is a precondition for improving bureaucratic accountability. It is therefore a
requirement under the law (art. 15, clause a). These standards include clear timeframes for service delivery (art. 21, clause d) and tariffs and fees for specific services
(art. 31). Evaluations of public service providers must be based on clear and measurable
indicators (art. 10, clause 3), and undertaken through internal and external supervisory
mechanisms. Direct superiors (atasan langsung) as well as functional supervisors (pengawas
fungsional) within public service providers are expected to provide internal assessments.
External assessment is provided through the public,
the Ombudsman’s office and the legislature (art. 35).
Internal oversight mechanisms
Monitoring and complaints management
The introduction of service standards would be futile in the absence of mechanisms to
monitor service delivery and an effective system to receive and respond to complaints. Hence
the law requires the establishment of monitoring and complaints mechanisms. Responsibility
for the direction, supervision and evaluation of service provision resides with ministers,
directors of government agencies and contracted agencies at the national level. At the
provincial level, it resides with governors, and at the local level with district heads (bupati)
and mayors (walikota). Ministers, directors of government agencies and the like are required
to report to the president and the national parliament. Governors should inform both their
provincial parliaments and an unspecified central government minister about the
outcome of public service delivery evaluations. District heads and mayors report to the
governor of the province and the local parliament (art. 6).
Complaints management by public service providers involves publicising the contact
details of personnel operationally responsible for complaints handling, and identifying
executives ultimately in charge of the process; outlining procedures for the management
of complaints; recording the identity of complainants; reporting on the process and the
outcome of complaints; and monitoring and evaluating the system overall (art. 36–37).
The importance of clear time-frames for complaints handling is emphasised in art. 50,
clauses 1–2.
Imposing sanctions
Chief executives or other officials of public service providers who fail to comply with the
regulations on complaints handling are subject to sanctions (art. 54, clause 5), including
written warnings, salary reductions, demotions and criminal charges for individual
officials, and suspension or revocation of licences for public service providers (art. 54,
8

clause 10). Behaviour invoking sanctions includes
8 Since most providers are government organisations, the idea of suspension or revocation of
licences seems neither appropriate nor realistic. For private sector contractors it would seem more
sensible to include appropriate sanctions for non-performance in the terms of their contracts with
the relevant government.

failing to provide services in accordance with standards; ignoring complaints; by-passing
established rules on ‘contracting-out’ services; and allowing ineligible parties to use
public service facilities.
External oversight mechanisms
The law also aims to establish external oversight mechanisms to improve public service
delivery. There are stipulations on the expansion of the role of the Ombudsman and the
establishment of citizen committees tasked with deliberating on service standards and
monitoring service delivery. Providers are required to respond to complaints from the
public and recommendations from the Ombudsman, as well as to suggestions from the
national and regional legislatures.
Expanding the role of the Ombudsman
Offices of the Ombudsman can play an important role in strengthening bureaucratic
accountability, by providing the public with access to independent complaints handling
mechanisms and reporting on violations of public service standards. An Ombudsman
was established in Indonesia in 2000 with the adop
tion of Presidential Decree 22/2000. The office was assigned two main tasks: to
create an environment that would help to curb corruption, and to defend the right of
9

citizens to high-quality public service delivery. In September 2008 the parliament passed
Law 37/2008 on the Ombudsman, which strengthened the legal basis for the
10

institution. With the enactment of this law, the Ombudsman became
an official state institution much like the Corruption Eradication Commission,
responsible to the national parliament and the president (art. 42). Over the last
few years branch offices have been established in the provinces of Central Java and
North Sumatra, in addition to the head office in Jakarta (Crouch 2008: 386–9).
As noted, the Law on Public Services expands the responsibilities of the Ombudsman.
Most important is the obligation to establish regional branches within three years of
enactment of the law to support the head office in monitoring the delivery of public
services. The law does not elaborate on the monitoring functions and complaints
mechanisms involving the Ombudsman, but refers to the Ombudsman regulations for
details (art. 46, clauses 3–4, 7). The Ombudsman is also given authority to mediate,
conciliate or adjudicate financial settlements. The adjudication mechanism is to be put in
place no later than five years after the enactment of Law 25/2009. The exact rules of
adjudication are to be set out by the Ombudsman (art. 50, clauses 5–7).
Strengthening the role of the public
One of the main aims of the public services law is to increase the leverage of the public
over the bureaucracy. Two stipulations aimed at enabling this merit close attention. First,
the law formally expands public participation in relation to public service provision.
Service providers must involve the public in the drafting of
public service standards. Currently the law only specifies that public participation
9 For an account of the origins of the Ombudsman’s office, see Crouch (2008: 385–90).
10 Prior to the enactment of this law, the Ombudsman was responsible to the president. However,
the Ombudsman’s office was already operationally independent under the relevant presidential
decree.

should be guided by principles of non-discrimination and be directly related to
public service issues (art. 20, clauses 2, 4–5). Further clarification is to be provided
in subsequent regulations.
Second, the law assigns extensive ‘monitoring’ functions to the public. Members of the
public are given the power to register formal complaints if providers neglect or violate
their obligations, or if officers deliver services that are not in accordance with service
standards (art. 40, clause 3). They are entitled to receive a formal response to such
complaints (art. 44, clause 3) and can complain directly to providers. Complaints may
also be made indirectly to the Ombudsman and the national and regional parliaments. In
addition, members of the public are entitled to make claims for compensation (art. 42,
clause 4), and to file lawsuits against providers that fail to meet minimum service
standards. Most importantly, the law allows for the establishment of public service
supervision agencies (lembaga pengawasan pelayanan publik) at the national and local level.
The exact details of how public participation in the definition, administration and
monitoring of public services will be accomplished remain to be clarified in subsequent
implementing regulations (art. 39, clauses 3–4).
ANALYSIS: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM TYPES AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW
In the last decade, during which most countries in Southeast Asia embarked upon
administrative reform initiatives, four broad reform types have crystallised, varying in
purpose and scope (Fritzen 2007). Some initiatives emphasise rules and are directed at
suppressing unwanted bureaucratic behaviour. Others are based on a more positive
‘promotional’ approach that tries to improve bureaucratic cul
ture and create incentive structures conducive to efficient service delivery. Both
types of initiatives can be implemented by targeting either state institutions or the broader
political context in which the bureaucracy is embedded. Initiatives that target state
institutions can be said to be organisational in scope, and those that target the broader
political context can be said to be structural in scope. This typology of reform approaches is
depicted in table 1.
Government selection of reform approaches is influenced by historical factors, one of
which is the pattern of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. As Fritzen
(2007: 1,451) explains:
[t]he historical legacy of two key variables influence[s] reform programs: [e]xtent
of separation ... between political and bureaucratic accountability; and [e]xtent of political
institutionalization at time of independence. Greater levels of both of these variables are
hypothesized to lead countries to pursue higher-leverage ‘promotional’ bureaucratic
reforms [and conversely] (Fritzen 2007: 1,451).
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Indonesia scores low on both the separation and institutionalisation variables. A few
years after independence the bureaucratic apparatus became highly
11 Promotional reform initiatives require capacities that are likely to be sufficiently developed only
in consolidated democracies, where principles of accountability are well established. These reform
types also require an ‘autonomous’ bureaucracy independent of special political interests (Fritzen
2007: 1,442).
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TABLE 1 Typology of Bureaucratic Accountability Reform Initiatives

Strategy
Controlling (suppressing
unwanted bureaucratic
behaviour)

Promotional (improving
bureaucratic culture)

Scope
Organisational (state
institutions)

Structural (broader political
context)

1 Rules and restraints e.g. asset
disclosure requirements;
internal rules; complaints and
feedback dealt with
administratively

3a Managerialist version:
political control 3b Democratic
version: e.g. watchdogs;
transparency-based
approaches; independent
anti-corruption commissions
4a Managerialist version: e.g.
privatisation; enhancement of
competitive pressure;
introduction of user fees;
establishment of independent
statutory agencies 4b
Democratic version:
democratic decentralisation/
devolution

2 Culture and incentives e.g.
meritocratic promotion;
improvement of organisational
culture; performance
measurement; pay reform;
administrative decentralisation

Source: Adapted from Fritzen (2007): 1,442.

politicised – via political parties after the 1955 elections and through coalitions between
the bureaucracy and the military after 1959. Then after 1966 the New Order regime
created various laws and regulations to bring the state apparatus under its control,
including a regulation that made every bureaucrat a member of the regime’s Golkar
organisation (effectively a highly privileged political party). In addition, there was no
cohesive, authoritative bureaucracy in place at the time of independence. Even after
Soeharto had created a highly centralised state apparatus, the bureaucracy continued to
suffer from ‘little self-confidence’ (Anderson 1998: 32), and the New Order regime ruled
over what was essentially a weak state apparatus (Slater 2010: 114). Against this
backdrop, the majority of bureaucratic reform initiatives adopted since 1998 have
focused on ‘rules and restraints’ (top part of table 1) aimed at controlling civil servants,
rather than creating an incentive structure to improve their performance. For example,
reforms have required senior civil servants and agency heads to declare their wealth, and
have subjected their business interests, at least formally, to official monitoring. In a
similar spirit, the Corruption Eradication Commission has delivered a string of
high-profile arrests, including those of governors and the heads of various public service
providers. Aulia Tantowi Pohan, the father-in-law of the president’s son, was arrested on
corruption charges in November 2008. Likewise, Syamsul Arifin, governor of North
Sumatra, was detained for corruption in October 2010. At the same time, promotional
reform initiatives (bottom part of table 1) remain under-developed. The Ministry of
Finance (MoF) is one of the few government

bodies that has adopted reforms of this kind, including a remuneration structure comparable
with that of the private sector and – at least on paper – an internally open job application
12

process (McLeod 2008: 197–201). Other state agencies have tried to emulate some of these
initiatives, including the Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) and the
13

Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung). Overall, promotional reform initiatives are still rare
and currently affect only around 2% of the total public service (Buehler 2010a: 6).

The content and scope of the Law on Public Services reflects the spirit of post-New
Order administrative reform. The law favours control, monitoring and punitive
measures over the creation of promotional incentive structures. This is most immediately
obvious when looking at the monitoring and evaluation system and the battery of
sanctions applicable under the new legislation. While the purpose of the law is ‘control’,
the scope of the law is both ‘organisational’ and ‘structural’ (quadrants 1 and 3 of table
1). To be effective, restraint-oriented civil service reforms need to be embedded in a
political and institutional environment conducive to the enforcement of the punitive
measures on which they rely. The following paragraphs evaluate the amenability of the
current political and legal context to the enforcement of both the organisational and
structural control measures contained in the new law.
Organisational control measures and their enforcement
The new law introduces various organisational rules and restraints, such as mandatory
service standards, monitoring and complaints mechanisms, and numerous sanctions, but
a range of obstacles hinder their enforcement.
Service standards
A sound understanding of the cost of government services is an important prerequisite
for defining minimum service standards. At present, expertise for costing services is
inadequate in Indonesia, especially within local government.
Providers responding to demands from the public may therefore define public services
or set minimum standards without taking fiscal realities into account.
There is a serious risk that citizen committees and public service providers will
be overambitious when formulating such standards and render them fiscally
unachievable. This would have significant negative consequences in terms of
respect for the new law. Broader political dynamics also seem likely to weaken
enforcement, particularly at the level of local government, where most public services are
delivered. Local governments might (reasonably) perceive the requirement to formulate
public service standards and to report on their performance to higher levels of
government as an attempt by the central government to diminish their autonomy. Under
Law 22/1999 on Regional Government, most public service delivery functions were
transferred to districts and municipalities and, to a much lesser extent, to provinces.
Subsequent amendments contained in the
12 In reality, only a small number of positions (within the MoF’s training institute and the
Center for Policy Analysis and Harmonization) have been filled through ‘open’ application
procedures (albeit open only to applicants from within the ministry). 13 Ironically, the Supreme
Court remains secretive about the status of its program, and no information about its progress was
available at the time of writing.

successor Law 32/2004 required minimum service standards for obligatory functions of
local governments, but not for optional functions (Ferrazzi 2005: 228). By
contrast, the Law on Public Services requires the definition of minimum service
standards for all public services. Law 25/2009 is therefore inconsistent with Law
32/2004. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the regulations on mandatory service
standards dictated by the national government can be reconciled with the interests of
sub-national governments post-decentralisation.

14

Complaints handling mechanisms
There are also considerable challenges to the implementation of the oversight and complaints
mechanisms. First, the law contains insufficiently developed regulations on the protection of
complainants. It simply states that anonymity shall be granted under ‘certain circumstances’, and
that if making a complaint could endanger a citizen, separate hearings must be conducted for the
complainant and representatives of the provider (art. 48, clause 3). But the law does not specify
what constitutes such ‘circumstances’ or ‘dangers’. While this law might not be the appropriate
place to deal with such matters, more stringent rules on witness protection would be useful,
because the broader framework for witness protection is highly inadequate. Law 13/2006 on
Witness Protection established a witness and victim protection agency, but its drafting suffers from
serious shortcomings. These include a narrow understanding of who is considered a witness, an
unclear

definition of what constitutes a threat, and a failure to stipulate how the state
should protect witnesses, including whistle-blowers (Asian Human Rights Commission
15

2007). Owing to its poor formulation, this law is rarely put into practice. Inadequacies
such as these potentially undermine the proper enforcement of the complaints handling
mechanisms in Law 25/2009.
Second, the law’s stipulations on evaluation and monitoring are likely to create tensions
between national and regional governments. According to the law, directors of government
agencies report directly to the president and the national parliament (art. 6, clause 4). Governors
are obliged to report to the provincial parliament and the (unspecified) relevant minister at the
national level (art. 6, clause 5). District heads and mayors are accountable to their own parliaments
as well as to the provincial governor (art. 6, clause 6) (even though the latter appears to have no
power of sanction over them). District heads and mayors may perceive this as a re-centralisation of
New Order power structures. Their resistance to implementing the law under these circumstances
is likely to result in ineffective monitoring.

Realpolitik might also paralyse the mechanisms for complaints handling. The law tries
to provide both vertical and horizontal accountability by making service providers and
individual officers accountable for their handling of complaints to
14 This may be especially problematic in regions that have had a difficult relationship with
the centre in the past, such as Aceh. Formally semi-autonomous, most of that province’s
bureaucratic regulations continue to be defined by the national government.
15 Ironically, Indonesian bureaucrats have discovered that the Law on Witness Protection
can be used as a means to evade corruption investigations. In past months, state officials
have repeatedly sought the help of the Witness and Victim Protection Agency to avoid interrogation and potential arrest by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Rayda 2010).

both agents higher up, and to parliaments situated in the same tier of government. However,
horizontal accountability has greatly declined in the last few years in both national and
sub-national politics. While legislators at both levels have become more assertive in criticising the
executive branch of government since the demise of the New Order (as exemplified by the
parliamentary inquiry into the Bank Century case) (Baird and Wihardja 2010: 144–6), the
parliaments still lack a convincing track record of effectively monitoring the administration. At the
national level, with very little real opposition in place, a party cartel – often referred to rather
euphemistically as the ‘rainbow coalition’ (Diamond 2009; Sherlock 2009) – shapes the
relationships between the executive and the legislature (Slater 2004).
At the sub-national level, the political influence of the executive has increased considerably since
2005, when new regulations and laws were implemented which cut back the oversight functions of the
local legislature (Aspinall 2006: 194). In particular, Law 32/2004 on Regional Government stripped local
parliaments of their right to impeach heads of local government, appoint regional secretaries, and screen
election candidates running for district head or mayor. The law was also modified to abolish the right of
local parliaments to demand accountability reports from local heads of government, apparently because
legislators had abused this legislative review process to extort bribes from government officials. At the
same time, executive and bureaucratic powers in budget and regulatory matters related to the delivery of
public services were strengthened. Law 32/2004 on Regional Government expanded the fiscal authority
of local government heads, who are now empowered to control the financial management of their
respective territories, authorise expenditure and set priorities, as well as to decide on the level of budget
spending (art. 156). While theoretically budgets need to be approved by local parliaments (art. 181),
evidence suggests that parliamentary participation in the budget process has been limited and fraught
with problems. Law 32/2004 also increased the power of local heads of government by allowing them, as
well as the local assembly, to issue regulations (art. 140). Recent experience shows that local parliaments
rarely initiate the introduction of such regulations, and local government heads dominate this process
(Ibrahim, Sirajuddin and Sholahuddin 2009: 1–42). Finally, Law 32/2004 allows district heads and
mayors to intervene directly in the work of the legislature. For example, the appointment and control of
civil servants in the local parliament secretariat now fall under the authority of the district head or
mayor. This change has reduced the autonomy of sub-national parliaments and weakened their ability to
scrutinise executive heads, since the secretariat is the body that usually prepares the material for
legislators to use in holding local executive heads accountable.

With the legislative branch weakened, Law 25/2009 will probably increase vertical
accountability only, making sub-national executive heads more accountable to officials
higher up. This is at odds with the devolution of power since 1998, and is therefore a
potential source of conflict between the tiers of government, as mentioned above. Such
vertical tensions could be exacerbated if Indonesia follows international practice in the
evaluation of public service delivery, given that this most often relies on ‘self-assessment’
mechanisms, including rating systems, customer satisfaction surveys and benchmark
comparisons, in which the central government is usually heavily involved (DILG 2000;
DILG 2002; Ferrazzi 2005: 229).

Enforcing sanctions
Enforcement of the sanctions contained in the law implicitly takes for granted the power
of senior bureaucrats within the state apparatus. This may not accurately reflect the
power dynamics within Indonesian public service providers. Examining power relations
within the bureaucracy more than three decades ago, one observer noted:
In their routine efforts to gather information, implement decisions, and mobilize
employees, superiors were faced with the fact that they often did not have sufficient
authority to do these things ... [Civil servants often argued] to outsiders, and to themselves,
that because government salaries were so low, superiors did not have a right to demand
more than a minimum of obedience from them ... It was recognized at the top, just as it was
widely claimed at the bottom, that the government did not have the right to demand more
than semi-obedience and half-effort ... On paper, Indonesian superiors ... had the power to
act against transgressors and to require subordinates to work every hour of each day, but it
was recognized by everyone that what was written down was not conceded in fact, and that
it would be futile to act as if it were. The natural response of employees who suffered cuts
in honoraria or incentive money was to work less ... The incapacity, or extreme reluctance,
of superiors to punish transgressions occurring at others’ or even their own expense
permitted a chronic crisis of authority to infect every pore of the government bureaucracy.
The result was to work at a snail’s pace or, commonly, not to work at all (Conkling 1979:
443–550).

More recently, McLeod (2010) has argued that officials at higher levels are likely
to be involved in corruption in order to supplement their own meagre salaries, which are low
relative to those in the private sector. They therefore have strong incentives to encourage
subordinates to participate in the systemic corruption characteristic of Indonesia’s public sector. In
this way they protect themselves against potential whistle-blowers. Weak authority among
superiors is likely to persist despite the nominal availability of formal means of punishment, as
civil servants will continue to seek refuge in the rhetoric of insubordination because of low pay. A
foreign governance specialist predicted that bureaucrats will probably continue to deliver services
in the same manner, perfectly aware that most of the sanctions put forward will not be imposed by
their superiors (Ferrazzi, pers. comm., 8 March 2010). It is unclear how the law can provide an
impetus for

changing the mindset of civil servants while official salaries remain below those
of the private sector, since punitive measures cannot realistically be enforced.
Budgetary constraints
The Law on Public Services is also unrealistic in relation to the fiscal context in
which these services are delivered. Public services are supplied either free of
charge or at significantly below their cost of production. This necessarily implies
a call on the budget, because consumers pay less than the unit production cost. Thus the
quantity and quality of such services is determined through the political mechanism rather
than by balancing their value to consumers against their cost. Although there may be strong
political support for the provision of statesubsidised services such as education and health,
there is also a reluctance to pay
the taxes needed to finance them. Typically, demand will exceed supply, because

funding will be inadequate. Responding to excess demand by raising the price of the
service is not an option for state-owned utilities and other service providers.
On the contrary, faced with a fixed budget, such agencies have little scope for
expanding their output or improving the quality of their service. Although Law 25/2009
is premised on the belief that it will be effective in forcing public service providers to
increase the quantity and/or quality of services, logic suggests otherwise. Without the
necessary funds, this is an impossibility (except to the limited
extent permitted by increasing operational efficiency).
Also impractical is the call for the punishment of officials who commit ‘transgressions’
in matters that are clearly beyond their control. For example, failure to provide adequate
infrastructure for service delivery can be penalised by a salary reduction for up to one
year, equal to the annual salary increase (art. 54, clause 5). Failure to provide adequate
funds for public service delivery will lead to a written warning. Failure to rectify funding
issues within a year will lead to loss of managerial rank (art. 33, clause 2; art. 54, clause
3). Likewise, officials who fail to provide budgetary funds for compensation payments
will be penalised by the loss of their managerial rank (art. 50, clause 4; art. 54, clause 7).
Yet in each of these three cases, officials in public service providers are legally obliged to
make do with budget allocations determined by others. It is absurd to penalise them if
the funds available are insufficient to meet specified service delivery standards. They
will always be able to argue that shortcomings in service delivery are the consequence of
insufficient funding rather than incompetence or negligence.
Structural control measures and their enforcement
Expanding role of the Ombudsman
The law introduces control measures that are structural rather than organisational in scope by
expanding the role of watchdog organisations (quadrant 3 of table 1). Most important among
these provisions are the greater responsibilities given to the Ombudsman and the
introduction of citizen committees. Again, the challenges to successful implementation of
these measures are considerable.
First, the law is inconsistent in relation to the establishment of regional
branch offices of the Ombudsman. It is not clear whether the creation of such
branches is mandatory, or at which levels of government (‘regions’) they should be
16

established. Second, branches would be responsible only for complaints about national
providers operating at the sub-national (local) level. They have
no mandate for handling complaints concerning local providers. Local offices of
the Ombudsman would therefore still be needed to establish an avenue for complaints
about service delivery by local governments, which are responsible for the bulk of public
services in Indonesia. However, neither the Law on Public Services nor the Law on the
17

Ombudsman requires that local offices be established. Third, the Ombudsman can only
recommend sanctions for public service providers and those individual officers it deems
negligent in complying with delivery standards and the requirements of the law. Gayus
Lumbuun, a member of the national
16 The word ‘region’ is not defined in the law. In the Indonesian context it is often used
collectively to refer to provinces, districts and municipalities. 17 Yogyakarta province and the
district of Asahan in North Sumatra province are two of
the few sub-national governments that have established local offices of the Ombudsman.

parliament’s Commission III for Legal Affairs and Human Rights in 2008, aptly described
the dependence of the Ombudsman on the cooperation of public service providers and
enforcement agencies in responding to its recommendations:
It is the [Ombudsman]’s job to accommodate people’s complaints and make recommendations to sanction guilty officers. We hope all state institutions will be committed to
enforcing the recommendations. In fact, the Ombudsman Law indirectly requires
commitment from these institutions (Maulia 2008).

Crouch (2008: 397) believes that, with regard to specific grievances, ‘the moral
weight of [the Ombudsman’s] conclusion … is often sufficient to influence good
governance change’, but argues that the Ombudsman is less effective in addressing systemic
failures [emphasis added]. The slow manner in which the notoriously corrupt Supreme Court
has responded (if at all) to recommendations made by the Ombudsman (Jakarta Post, 9
January 2009) exemplifies the lack of commitment of many public service providers.
In short, the emphasis placed on the Ombudsman conceals the fact that enforcement of
its recommendations relies entirely on other government agencies. The past decade has
shown that the majority of power abuse by public officials continues to go unpunished,
indicating a weak commitment by enforcement agencies in reacting to complaints
forwarded by the Ombudsman.
Establishing citizen committees
The enforcement of stipulations that demand a stronger role for the public in relation to
monitoring service delivery faces similar challenges. The law is silent about compensation for
those who participate in monitoring public service delivery through these committees, so it is
unclear what incentive individuals will have to join them. Those most likely to do so are
Indonesians on the payroll of civil society organisations and, directly or indirectly, the foreign
18
development assistance industry. While civil society organisations have certainly become
more vocal since the demise of the New Order in 1998 (Setiyono and McLeod 2010), they
remain weak and fragmented, and have arguably failed to bring about significant
political reforms during the last decade. Their lack of success is due to a combination of
low organisational capacity in non-governmental groups and a lack of horizontal links
within civil society (Andriyani 1996); to an electoral framework that deliberately creates
high entry costs for political participation (Boudreau 2009); and to the peculiarities of
clientelistic politics that have often allowed political elites to co-opt civil society
(Holloway 2001).
Strengthening political control
Against this backdrop of low bureaucratic capacity, a disinclination to enforce rules and
restraints (quadrant 1 of table 1) and the dependency of watchdog
organisations (lower part of quadrant 3 of table 1) on inefficient and corruptionridden law enforcement agencies, political control (upper part of quadrant 3 of table 1) is
the only remaining avenue with the potential to enforce the punitive
18 The latest available data from 2002 show that of the 13,500 civil society organisations that were
registered with the government, 90% received foreign funding (O’Rourke 2008).

measures stipulated in the law. Historically, it has most often been political elites that
th

initiated and oversaw successful civil service reform. In 19 century Britain, reforming
the bureaucratic apparatus became a priority of the ruling elite, in the context of
socio-economic changes that created new political players who challenged established
political interests.
The transformations to the class system stemming from the collapse of agricultural land
values and the emergence of a new and self-made bourgeoisie led the old aristocracy to
make major concessions to avoid the déluge precipitated by the failure of their counterparts
in France and elsewhere to make similar concessions (Harris 2003: 213).

In the United States, civil service reform was successful only after it received the
endorsement of ruling political elites. The municipal reform movement against political
machines at the end of the 19 century, for example, was spearheaded by
th

white Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle-class businesspeople and civic leaders. The reformers
tended to be old-stock Americans who were moved ... by fear and resentment of recent
immigrants (Berman 2000: 258).

Likewise, efforts to stop the expansion of the Cosa Nostra within the Italian state became
more successful after counter-elites emerged during the modernisation of Sicily after
World War II. This process
brought with it an expanding urban and educated middle class, some constituen
cies of which have supported an anti-mafia social movement, a revitalized policejudicial campaign against organized crime, and a reform government in Palermo, the regional
capital. [T]he leaders of these developments are engaged in a serious
effort to change how ordinary people think about and relate to the mafia (Schneider
and Schneider 2003: 290).

The pattern can also be found in Southeast Asia. The importance of inter-elite rifts for
initiating bureaucratic reform has been shown for Vietnam (Gainsborough 2002: 705), the
Philippines (Boudreau 2009: 237), and most recently Indonesia. Of the latter, Crouch
(2010: 11) says:
Post-crisis reform [in Indonesia] did not follow a standard ‘democratic template’ in which
freely elected legislators responded to popular pressures and bureaucrats implemented the
principles of ‘good governance’ in pursuit of a perception of the long-term ‘national
interest’. Rather it was the product of protracted bargaining between largely self-serving
parties, both old and new.

Such inter-elite competition has fluctuated greatly over the last decade, being
most intense in the immediate aftermath of Soeharto’s demise. During this time
fundamental reforms were adopted, including far-reaching electoral and constitutional
changes and the devolution of political power to regional governments. But inter-elite
competition has steadily diminished as democracy has consolidated (Aspinall 2010).
While Indonesia now has genuinely competitive elections, it does not necessarily have
competitive elites (Slater 2006: 209). Thus a cartel-like party system ensures cosy
relationships among members of the national political establishment (Diamond 2009). In
sub-national politics, genuinely new forces have failed in their attempts to enter politics
(Hadiz 2010), as an analysis of the socioeconomic background of candidates in the

gubernatorial elections between 2005 and 2008 shows (Buehler 2010b). The Prosperous
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was the only political movement of the
post-New Order era that offered Indonesian voters an alternative to the existing political
establishment. Its members differed from those of other parties in their socio-economic
background and the kind of milieu in which they were rooted. PKS has since been drawn
into the web of money politics and rent-seeking (Shihab and Nugroho 2008). This has led
to the assimilation of a party that for some time seemed likely to become the nucleus of a
19

genuine political opposition. The current political climate paralyses the inter-elite
competition that is potentially conducive to administrative reform. With elite frictions
being largely absent, pressure on politicians to embrace and enforce bureaucratic reform
is minimal.

CONCLUSION
The Law on Public Services was adopted to improve bureaucratic accountability
and thus increase the leverage of society over the state. It makes the definition
of service standards mandatory, establishes monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and
outlines sanctions for sub-standard service delivery. At the same time, it aims to restructure
the broader environment in which the bureaucracy is embedded, by expanding the
responsibilities of the Ombudsman and introducing citizen committees. In emphasising
restraints and control measures, it complements other civil service reform initiatives adopted
in Indonesia in the last 10 years, most of which focus on punitive measures as the key to
improving public sector performance.
Enforcement is the Achilles heel of administrative reform initiatives that centre on ‘control’. It
has been argued here that enforcement of the restraints and rules outlined in the law is beyond the
current capacity of Indonesia’s political and legal system. Bureaucratic inexperience in
citizen-driven service standard formulation, tensions between different levels of government and
endemic corruption within enforcement agencies obstruct the implementation of organisational
restraint measures. For similar reasons it will be difficult to enforce control measures within the
broader environment that are aimed at improving accountability. Complaints mechanisms rely
heavily on the office of the Ombudsman, which, with its limited scope and its powers that do not
go beyond reprimands, has struggled to make itself meaningful in the new political landscape. The
law’s lack of realism in relation to these difficulties is evident in its failure to account for the budget
constraints faced by public service providers. If the funds allocated are inadequate, even the most
efficient, honest and hard-working civil servants cannot deliver services of the desired quality and
in the volumes promised to the public.

Genuine inter-elite competition – a catalyst for civil service reform in many countries
in different periods – was lacking in Indonesia at the time of writing.
19 The parallels to the fate of the radical socialist parties in Europe are obvious. See, for example,
Przeworski’s lament about the ‘embourgeoisement of the socialist movement’ after left-wing
groups had started to participate in elections (1980: 29).

The last decade has seen the rise of a cartel of parties and the failure of truly new forces to
enter the political arena. While elites deemed political and administrative reform a necessity
for their survival or advancement in the aftermath of the fall of Soeharto, a post-New Order
equilibrium has already been established in which there is little impetus for further reform.
Accordingly, recent ‘reform’ initiatives seem intended merely to provide a smokescreen for a
lack of substantive action. In short, while the reform aims of the public service law are
laudable, its successful implementation is open to serious doubt.
The mismatch between the systemic capacities required by Law 25/2009 and those available is
not without consequences. Most immediately, it is predictable that the law will simply not be very
effective, if it is effective at all. Like many other reform initiatives of the past decade, this law seems
likely to become another symbol of the claimed ‘reforming spirit’ of the SBY administration,
without actually producing tangible results for citizens. In a more pessimistic scenario, the law will
actually hamper bureaucratic effectiveness. Reform initiatives aimed simply at suppressing certain
actions, without providing rewards for changing behaviour, have often resulted in civil servants
slowing down the release of funds for public service delivery, out of a fear of being wrongly
accused of corrupt behaviour (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996).

The difficulties surrounding the meaningful implementation of this law
strongly suggest that the power balance in state–society relations cannot be tilted in
favour of society simply by crafting legal documents that assign a nominally prominent
role to the public. Even if society were to involve itself actively in the standard-setting
and monitoring functions given to it by the new law, the state is unlikely to be able to
deliver. Ironically, in order for society to gain greater leverage in politics, state capacity
must increase as well.
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